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ABSTRACT
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF
"MARKET DISCIPLINE" OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET BANKING RISK

Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic increase and risk
exposure of Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) banking activities in recent
years, and proposed that some OBS activities be included in the
calculation of a risk-based capital requirement. This paper
investigates the riskiness of OBS activities. Specifically, this
paper reports on three capital market tests of OBS banking risk:
the impact of OBS activities on the risk-premia of subordinated
debt, on equity risk and on systematic risk of large commercial
banks and bank holding companies. The underlying premise of this
study is that the bank stockholders and subordinated debtholders
are more exposed to the risk of bank failure resulting from OBS
banking risk than insured and uninsured depositholders. If aBS
activities are significantly related to market measures of bank
risk, then "market discipline" of such activities exists. The
empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of CBS
banking risk on the default risk-premia borne by subordinated debt
holders. The results indicate that most aBS activities reduce risk
premia and equity risk, but do not affect systematic risk. Both
stockholders and subordinated debtholders price these aBS
activities as risk-reducing. Therefore, regulatory interference in
the form of additional capital requirement of aBS activities will
penalize large commercial banks and will create distortions in the
financial intermediation market.

I.

Introduction
Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic increase in off-balance

sheet (OBS) banking activities in recent years.

Off-balance sheet activities

are not summarized in dollars on the balance sheet but are instead given in the
verbal footnotes to balance sheets.
activities to regulatory authorities.

Ho,{ever, banks are required to report such
In off-balance sheet transactions, banks

earn fee incomes instead of interest spreads, and loans are not held on the
books.
As a result of these OBS activities, banks may face three general types of
portfolio risk:

credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due

to liability mismatches on commitment takedmms and liquidity risk due to
overextension of obligations.

Unlike balance sheet items, these potential

obligations are not funded with balance sheet liabilities and are not considered
in determining a bank's regulatory capital requirements.

On March 1, 1988, the

Federal Reserve, in conjunction ,{ith other bank regulatory agencies and foreign
central banks issued a risk-based capital proposal, which will be phased in by
1992, that some off-balance sheet items be included in calculating such a
capital requirement.
A key rationale for OBS banking capital regulation is an assumed
information asymmetry between bank managers and liability holders.

The

regulatory presumption is that such ODS activities are risky and the market
fails to recognize the risk embodied in such ODS activities.

The "market

discipline'! studies of ODS banking risk have addressed the question of whether
market prices of bank liabilities reflect the risk of ODS activities.

If

"market discipline" exists and off-balance sheet activities are found to be
risk-sensitive, bank liability holders can distinguish ODS banking risk.

The
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assumed information asymmetry rationale for capital regulation of OBS
activities, therefore, becomes less convincing.
The purpose of this paper is to rigorously explore the riskiness and
motivation of OBS banking activities.
market tests of OBS banking risk:

This research reports on three capital

the impact of OBS activities on the

risk-premia of subordinated debt, on equity risk and on systematic risk of large
commercial banks and bank holding companies.

This research improves upon the

existing evidence of OBS banking risk in three important \.;ays.

First, ,..hile the

relationships betHeen OBS activities and, total and systematic risks have been
studied, the empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of OBS risk
on the default-risk premia borne by subordinated debt-holders.

Second, this

paper examines the riskiness of all 19 OBS items -- categorized into seven
groups depending upon their similar characteristics -- from call and income
reports of the FDIC tapes.

Third, this study employs an etended data set

ranging from 1984 to 1988.

A pooled cross-section and time-series generalized

least squares (GLS) estimation procedure is employed to examine the "market
discipline" of OBS activities.

The underlying premise of this study is that the

bank stockholders and subordinated debtholders are more exposed to the risk of
bank failure than depositholders.

Therefore, their assessment of the riskiness

of OBS activities is realistically determined.

II.

Previous Research
The theoretical analysis of OBS banking activities primarily deals \.;ith the

motivation and existence of such activities.

The overriding conclusions of

theoretical analyses are that (1) OBS activities are natural banking activities,
and hence do not affect business risk of banking firms, (2) OBS activities
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provide diversification potential to bank stockholders, and hence reduce total
risk but do not affect systematic risk, (3) OBS activities are potentially
leverage increasing, and hence increase financial risk.
A number of competing hypotheses concerning risk-taking behavior of OBS
items have been proposed in literature.

A bank's activity in the market for

off-balance sheet credit enhancement is a function of its willingness to
accommodate the needs of its customers, the market's perception of bank's
quality as reflected in balance sheet decisions and the incentives provided by
the regulators.

Theories of financial intermediation suggest that OBS banking

activities are designed to provide credit enhancement services to its customers.
By guaranteeing funds availability, the intermediary has an incentive to
efficiently monitor the borrowers, produce information and signal its
credibility, and specialize in credit evaluation.

OBS banking activities thus

represent substitute methods for allocating credit with complementaries in
production.

The risk-return trade-off between saving information services and

warehousing assets will induce a bank to divide its business bet,{een both
balance and off-balance sheet financial activities.

Therefore, OBS activities

do not affect fundamental business risk of banking firms.

Because part of

business risk is diversifiable, the remaining market risk is also unaffected by
OBS activities.

The diversification hypothesis implies that banks engage in OBS

activities to diversify its asset portfolio in order to achieve within firm
diversification and to avoid the wrath of disappointed bank shareholders [see
Diamond (1984), Pavel (1987, 1988)J.

Vithin-firrn bank risk is reduced by low

correlation of OBS activities with other bank asset activities.

~Iarket

risk of

OBS activities is determined by diversification within banking firm and by
stockholders.

Therefore, part of diversifiable risk of bankfs total risk is
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eliminated by bank's \Jithin-firm diversification potential of ODS activities,
and part is eliminated by diversified stockholders in their mm portfolios.
This hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between total bank risk and OilS
activities.
The Leverage Hypothesis states that fixed rate deposit insurance together
with capital requirements provide incentives to increase financial leverage
through the issuance of OBS activities that are not subject to capital
requirements.

By increasing financial leverage in this way, a bank can enhance

whatever subsidies it receives from deposit insurance.

This hypothesis thus

predicts a positive relationship between total bank risk and OilS activities .[see
Pyle (1985), Benveniste and Berger (1986)].
The Collaterization and Underinvestment Hypothesis states that SLCs and
loan sales, two OBS items, are substitutes for collaterized debt claims because
banks are prohibited from issuing collaterized deposits.
have payoff characteristics similar to secured debt.

Loan sales and SLCs

Like secured debt, these

off-balance activities permit banks to sell a portion of cash-flo\Js associated
with ne\J investment opportunities.

The ability to engage in off- balance sheet

activities, therefore, permits banks to invest in loans with positive net
present value that they would pass up if restricted to deposit financing.
Capital requirements, which limit bank leverage, intensifies the under investment
problem by restricting a bank's ability to offset reductions in bank asset risk
with increases in financial leverage.

Fixed rate deposit insurance premium

increases the underinvestment problem because rates paid on bank deposits do not
reflect the marginal contribution of a neli investment to the risk of bank1s
portfolio of assets.

The underinvestment problem is likely to be greater if the

bank has riskier deposits and higher capital requirements.

Therefore, the
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amount of SLCs and Loan Sales are expected to be positively related to riskiness
of banks [see James (1988)J.
The empirical literature on the "market discipline" of aBS banking
activities tests for the existence of market sensitivity to bank risk by
regressing the relative cost of bank funds on balance-sheet and off-balance
sheet and/or income statement measures of risk, return and market position.

The

basic issue is whether the measures of bank risk are significantly related to
movements in bank liability or equity prices.

If significant relationships are

found, then "market discipline" is said to exist.
The empirical evidence on the existence of "market discipline" of aBS
banking activities in inconclusive.

The earliest \wrk by PettHay (1976, 1976a),

Beighly, Boyd and Jacobs (1975), Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) examined bank
financial policies on equity and liability prices.
PettHay investigated the impact of the bank's capital position on (1) the
risk premium of the bank's capital notes, (2) the bank's beta and (3) the
price-earnings (P/E) ratio, during the 1971-74 period.

This cross-section study

indicated that dividend yield, payout ratio and earnings groHth are significant
in explaining the variability of price-earnings ratios.

He also found no

apparent relationship between beta and these accounting variables for large
banks prior to 1974 and slightly significant inverse relationship after 1974.
A study by Beighly, Boyd and Jacobs (1975) examined the relationship
between financial leverage and stock price for 113 bank holding companies for
the periods 1972 through 1974.

They used the average level of the common stock

price (three month average) as a dependent variable.

They found that dividends,

earnings gro\,1th, firm size and loan loss rate were the most important
determinants of the market prices of bank equities.

They also found that for
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the given sample of bank holding companies, the higher a bank's degree of
financial leverage at a point in time, the lower is the bank's stock price
(after controlling for bank size, earnings gro\{th, dividends and loan losses).
Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) investigated the relationship bet\{een financial
policies of commercial banks and two market determined measures of risk.
Financial policies are proxied by average balance sheet and income statement
data over the period 1972-76 for 95 commercial banks and bank holding companies.
Accounting data measures of financial leverage, liquidity, dividend payout
ratio, loan loss experience and variability in earnings and deposits are used.
These are related to a measure of systematic risk (beta) and total risk
(standard deviation of equity return), also calculated for the same five-year
period.

Bivariate and multivariate relationships are examined.

As independent

variables used to explain beta, the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio,
variability of deposits and the loan to deposit ratio are significant.

In

explaining total risk the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, a financial
leverage measure, variability of deposits and earnings, a loan loss measure and
a liquidity measure are all significant.
Baer and Bre\{er (1986) regressed CD rates over quarterly measures of bank
accounting risk variables for a sample of 37 banks over the time period 1979-82.
They present evidence that bank CD rates are strongly affected by accounting
based measures of bank risk-taking.
discipline bank
premium.

risk-t~{ing

The market for large, uninsured CDs helps

by penalizing risky banks with a higher CD risk

Baer and Brewer study (1985) supports the conclusions of another study

by Hannan and Han\{eck (1988) that employs survey data on CD rates for five
different maturities and finds that CD risk premiums increase \{ith both the
ratio of risky assets to capital and uncertainty regarding bank returns on
assets.
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Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) conducted a cross-section study of
subordinated debt pricing for both 1983 and 1984.

Subordinated debt is junior

to uninsured CDs so that its pricing ought to show clear responses to risk
measures.

HOwever, examining the spread over the comparable treasury yields

these authors were unable to demonstrate the effect of any balance sheet or
income statement data on bank costs.

They also conclude that implicit insurance

of a bank debt is not a consistent explanation for the lack of correlation
bet'veen default premia and on-balance accounting measures of risk because there
is significant variation of risk premia across banks in the sample.
Although none of these studies include OBS banking risk variables, these
studies show the appropriateness of accounting-based risk models in analyzing
the impact of OBS banking activities on bank risk measures.
Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) explain CD rates as function of the
general level of interest rates and various measures of bank risk including
SLCs.

Accounting risk variables used are loan-loss reserve position, net income

ratio, interest sensitive liabilities, capital over risky assets and SLCs over
risky assets.

The effects of bank's SLC exposure on CD rate is treated as

having t'vo components:

a leverage effect (the ratio of bank capital to risky

assets including loans and SLCs) and a credit quality effect (the ratio of SLCs
to risky assets, to allo,v for differences in credit quality of the loan and SLC
portfolios).

Based on this model, they found that CD rates rose with increasing

leverage and fell with increases in SLCs as a proportion of total risky assets.
Since these t,vo factors tend to cancel each other, the net effect on bank risk
of an increase in bank's SLC exposure apparently is negligible.

The inclusion

of SLC as a ratio of total risky assets did not improve the explanatory power of
this model.

They explain this to be due to the capital/loan variable that
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impounds both the beneficial impacts of SLCs on credit quality and the adverse
impact of SLCs on capital exposure.

Their study also found that, despite higher

credit quality, increasing SLCs did not reduce bank risk.
Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) use an empirical method based on a
version of

CAP~1

that estimates systematic risk associated with various

components of a bank's income statement, balance sheet and off-balance sheet
activities.

In a time-series, cross-sectional analysis of 63 bank holding

companies for 1983-84 with a two factor CAPJl, it is found that equity market
prices SLCs but not loan commitments or commercial letters of credit.

Moreover,

SLCs are priced as risk-reducing, not risk-increasing activity of banks by
well-diversified shareholders.

The second factor used in

value-weighted banking industry stock market index.
of this study

IS

CAP~I

is a

The regulatory implication

that (1) loan commitments and commercial letters of credit are

not perceived as risk-increasing activities for banks and that their inclusion
in the recently proposed risk-based capital requirement is wrong, and (2) a tax
imposition in the form of capital requirement on SLCs, that disciplines bank
management and is perceived by the equity market as risk-reducing, is
inappropriate.
Lynge and Lee (1987) used accounting-based risk forecasting models to
investigate the impact of OilS items on both equity risk and systematic risk for
large commercial banks for the time period 1984-85 for a sample of 81 large
banks.

The estimated coefficients of independent variables incorporating

various aspects of OilS positions are statistically significant in a model
explaining total equity risk, but not significant in a model explaining
systematic risk.

The negative coefficients of OBS variables in a model

explaining total equity risk is attributed to diversification potential of these
banking activities.
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Pavel (1988) analyzes three reasons for loan sales -- funding,
diversification, and capital requirement -- by empirically testing their
relevance to and their implications for bank risk.

The data set used In the

study contains 117 bank holding companies during 1984 and 1985.
shows, on average, loan sales have little impact on bank risk.

This research
Funding,

diversification, and regulation all seem to be factors motivating loan sales,
but the use of loan sales to increase diversification or avoid regulation does
not significantly affect bank risk any more than other means to achieve these
ends.

Capital requirements do not seem to playas large a role in loan sales as

previous research indicated.

One explanation is that loan sales made

unprofitable by capital requirement are probably sold immediately and,
therefore, have no impact on a bank's portfolio.
Avery and Berger (1988) regressed measures of the current performance of a
bank's portfolio -- the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the ratio
of net chargeoffs to total loan and ratio of net income to total loans -
against measures of the bank's OBS activities to investigate the risk potential
of these activities.

They used two different data sets.

The first is collected

from Federal Reserve's Commitment Survey and includes a panel of individual bank
call and commitment data ranging from 1973 to 1987.

The second data set

consists of semi-annual call Report data on 11 OBS activities and bank
performance and control variables collected for all banks over 100 million
dollars of gross assets from 1985 to 1987.

Their research suggests that among

major OBS activities, SLCs are associated with poor bank performance but loan
commitments are associated

,~ith

better bank performance.

significant relationship was found
activities.

betl~een

No statistically

bank performance and other OBS

They conclude that risk-based capital proposal may be appropriate
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for SLCs but may be umvarranted for loan commitments because of their
risk-reducing potential.
James (1988) tests two hypotheses about loan sales and SLCs.

The first

hypothesis is that depositors and the FDIC are not necessarily worse off by
these tlVO OBS banking activities.

The second hypothesis is that since the

underinvestment problem is likely to be more severe the riskier the bank's
existing deposits and the greater the amount of equity capital a bank is
required to use for new loans, the volume of loan sales and SLCs are expected to
be greater the riskier the bank and for banks with binding capital requirement.
An analysis of CD rates of 58 banks over the period 1984 through 1986

reveal~

no

statistically significant relation between the risk premium on uninsured
deposits and the amount of SLCs outstanding or loan sales.

Moreover, the volume

of SLCs relative to bank capital is found to be positively related to balance
sheet measures of bank risk as well as financial leverage.
This paper employs an extended data set ranging from 1984 to 1988 and
examines risk behavior of all 19 OBS items from Call and Income Reports of the
FDIC tapes.

This research sheds further light on "market discipline" of OBS

banking risk by regressing OBS items against default-risk premia borne by
subordinated debtholders in addition to equity and systematic risk borne by
stockholders.

III. The Relationship of ODS Danking Activities to Risk-Premia Required on Bank
Subordinated Debt
3.1 Introduction
Subordinated debtholders are subject to a larger risk of loss than
uninsured depositors.

Market discipline by uninsured depositors appears limited
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by (a) these depositors' ability to withdraw funds quickly once a problem
situation becomes apparent, and (b) by the fact that they typically receive
de facto insurance coverage when the FDIC uses the method of purchase and
assumption to resolve a problem situation.

In contrast, subordinated debt can

be a source of funding that cannot be withdra'vn during adversity and is
generally not assumed by the purchasing bank ln a purchase and assumption
transaction.

Thus, subordinated debtholders are generally subject to greater

risk than uninsured depositors.
The potential of subordinated debt to enhance market discipline is examined
empirically by analyzing the interest rate spread between subordinated debt and
treasury securities.

This spread, or default-risk premia, is modeled as a

function of various on-balance and off-balance measures of risk.
3.2 Empirical Model
The follo'ving risk-premia model is estimated over cross-section and
time-series data using the generalized least squares (GLS) technique to examine
the risk-behavior of OBS banking activities.

The expected signs of partial

derivatives appear on each independent variable:
R - Rf

+

+

+

= f(OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR)

(1)

where
R - Rf = Default-risk premia;
OBS = Seven off-balance sheet variables constructed from 19 items
included in the RC-L schedule of the FDIC tapes;
LEV
DIY

= ratio of
= an index

total liabilities over total assets;
of diversification (the higher the diversification

index is, the higher the level of diversification is in the loan portfolio);
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= ratio of loan loss reserves over total assets;
AGAP = ratio of net position (total market rate assets minus market

ALass

rate liabilities) to total assets;
ASIZE
POR

= logarithm of assets of banks;

= cash

dividends over net income.

Leverage (LEY), diversification (DIY), Credit risk (ALOSS), Interest rate
risk (AGAP), Operating risk (ASIZE) and dividend payout (POR) are all on-balance
measures of risk, and have been used extensively in "market- discipline!' studies
of bank financial policies.

These variables· have been scaled do\{n by size in

order to avoid heteroskedasticity problem.
Two main effects of OBS banking activities on risk, namely diversification
and leverage effects, are rat ionalized in theoret ical literature.
a priori, it is difficult to say which effect dominates.

Ho\{ever, on

The negative sign of

DIY variable indicates that diversification by bank loan portfolio reduces total
risk.

The positive sign of LEV variable indicates that leverage ratios of banks

increase total risk.

In addition, the negative signs of OBS variables In

equation (1) imply that, after controlling for on-balance leverage and
diversification effects, risk-reducing diversification effect of aBS activities
dominates risk-increasing effects of aBS activities.
Table 1 reports 19 aBS activigties from the PC-L schedule of bank call and
income reports.

Seven off-balance variables have been constructed from these 19

aBS items.
3.3 Data Analysis
This research focuses on the 100 largest U.S. banks and BRCs, as these are
only ones with publicly traded subordinated debt and debentures.

Data on yield

measures \{ere gathered on all BRC for bank subordinated debt, debentures and
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capital notes which were publicly traded in the NYSE,

A~IEX,

NASDAQ

quoted

,~ith

sale and bid prices from

~Ioody

ends 1984 through 1988.

To make each BHC debt issue as homogeneous as possible,

I

s and Standard and Poor's bond manuals as of year

all zero coupon issues and floating rate issues were dropped from the sample.
This produced 171 issues for 50 BRCs in 1984, 137 issues for 49 BHCs in 1985,
160 issues for 48 BHCs in 1986, 174 issues for 43 BRCs in 1987 and 223 issues
for 49 banks in 1988.

Virtually all of

rather than the bank.

There was a fair amount of heterogeneity in terms of

maturity, coupons and issue size.

t~ese

bonds were issued against the BilCs

Acquisitions or name changes of banks have

been confirmed from Moody's Bank and Finance Manual in order to maintain
continuity in data collection.
The risk-free rates of Treasury Securities identical in maturity to each
debt issue were collected from Moody's Bond Record.

Yields of multiple issues

of a bank's subordinated debts are aggregated to calculate an average yield.
Risk-premiums are calculated by simply subtracting risk-free rates of identical
maturity from the yield measure.

The risk-premium used in this study is the

average premium of all outstanding issues for each BHC for each year.

The

on-balance and off-balance measures of risk ar.e constructed as defined earlier,
from variables available in the FDIC Call and Income Report for the years
through 1988.

1984

The risk-premia of each BHC is matched against on-balance and

off-balance measures of risk, and this resulted in a final sample of 32 bank and
llHCs for each year.

These risk-premia are then used as the dependent variables

in regression analysis of on-balance and off-balance measures of bank risk.
3.4 Analysis of Results
Table 3 provides the coefficient estimates of a basic risk-premia model.
Seven equations were estimated, one for each off-balance sheet group, using
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pooled cross-section and time-series data for 32 banks and bank-holding
companies over the years 1984-88.
negative signs.

All off-balance sheet items have expected

Three of these coefficients are significant at the 1% level

(APART, ACLC, AOBS) , tHO are significant at the 57. level (AOB, AS1{AP), and one
is significant at the 10% level (ACOaThI).
significantly different from zero.

The coefficient of SLC is not

This result is consistent Hith the results

of Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) for Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs) but
extends these results to other categories of OBS items.
Variations in the risk-premia on uninsured bank debt are significantly
correlated Hith" off-balance sheet variables, suggesting the presence of a
llmarket discipline. II Moreover, bank liability holders viel-l OBS variables as
risk-reducing.

The pricing signal that the banking industry receives from the

subordinated debt market appears to be at odds with the regulatory prescription
about off-balance sheet variables.

Those prescriptions require certain OBS

items be included in the risk-based capital requirement.

The risk-reducing

potential of off-balance sheet variables indicates that bank regulators may be
overly concerned about these banking activities and should not penalize banks
for these OBS activities by requiring additional capital.
The on-balance measures of risk, generally, obtain their expected signs.
Both leverage and diversification (LEV and DrV) variables have the expected
signs and are significant at the 57. level.

The significant negative

coefficients of OBS items along with expected signs of leverage and
diversification (LEV and DrV) variables also suggest that risk-reducing
diversification impacts of OilS activities dominate their risk-increasing
impacts.
level.

The interest rate risk (AGAP) is positive and significant at the 107.
The credit risk variable (ALOSS) is, however, significantly negative.
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Here multicollinearity between credit risk and interest rate risk (1LOSS and
AGAP) may be the cause of this perverse sign.

The dividend payout ratio (POR)

variable has an insignificant positive coefficient.

The size (ASIZE) variable

has, in general, negative coefficients and, in one case, is significant at the
17. level.

These results are consistent with studies by Pettway (1976), Pavel

and Philis (1987) and Koppenhaver (1987).

IV.

The Relationship of ODS Banking Activities to Equity Risk and Systematic
Risk of Large Dank and Dank-llolding Companies
4.1

Introduction

In order to examine whether equity prices reflect OBS banking risk, both
total risk and systematic risk have been regressed over on-balance and
off-balance measures of risk.

Total risk is proxied by standard deviation of

equity return and systematic risk is proxied by market beta.

Although the

CAP~[

is based upon ex ante observations the suggested model uses primarily ex post
data.

The market beta is determined from past prices and, therefore, is only an

estimate of historical beta.
4.2 Empirical Model
The following two models are estimated over cross-section and time-series
data employing a generalized least square (GLS) technique.

The expected signs

of partial derivatives appear on each independent variable:
~

=f

+

+

+

(OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR)
+

+

(2)

+

P = f (OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR)

(3)

These two models determine the relationship between the same on-balance and
off-balance sheet variables as in risk-premia model, except that the bank's
equity risk and systematic risk become the dependent variables.
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Theory suggests that OBS activities provide diversification benefits to
bank stockholders, and at the same time, increase financial risk by augmenting
leverage.

It is known that diversification potential will reduce diversifiable

risk and leverage potential will increase financial risk of total equity risk
respectively.

"~ich

effect dominates remains an empirical question.

If OBS

activities are rationalized as natural banking activity, they are not expected
to affect non-diversifiable systematic risk as measured by beta.
The negative sign of DIY variable indicates that diversification by bank
loan portfolio reduces total risk.

The positive sign of LEY variable indicates

that leverage ratios of banks increase total risk.

In addition, the negative

signs of OBS variables in equation (2) imply that, after controlling for
on-balance leverage and diversification effects, risk-reducing diversification
effect of OBS activities dominates risk-increasing effects of OBS activities.
4.3 Data Analysis
Extensive data on bank off-balance sheet activities (OBS) are available
beginning in 1984.

The initial sample utilized in this study consists of the

100 largest banks based on asset size which have continuous data over the years
1984 through 1988.

Market values of equity (EQUITY) for each bank or bank

holding company are collected from

CO~IPUSTAT

yearly tapes.

Daily bank stock

returns and market returns are gathered from the CRSP and the NASDAQ daily
tapes.

Data on off-balance sheet items are taken from the FDIC Call and Income

Reports for the lead bank of the holding company.

The sample is restricted to

those bank holding companies (BRC) whose lead bank accounts for the majority of
consolidated holding company assets.

The accounting risk variables defined ln

the previous section (LEY, DIY, AGAP, ALOSS, POR and ASIZE) are constructed from
data collected from the FDIC yearly tapes.

Data from the FDIC tapes, the
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COJIPUSTAT tapes, the CRSP tapes and the NASDAQ tapes are merged together, and
this resulted in a final sample of 32 banks and bank holding companies for 1984
through 1988.

The relative size of market risk measures, accounting risk

measures and ODS variables are shown in Table 2.
Equity risk is proxied by the standard deviation of equity return.
is the annualized standard deviation of daily equity return.

SIG~~Es

SIGJfAE

are

calculated for those bank holding companies for which 200 or more trading days
are available on CRSP and NASDAQ tapes.

It can be noted that only 63 bank

holding companies have equity return available on CRSP tape and 82 BHCs have
similar data available from the NASDAQ tape.
BETAs are calculated from daily equity returns for each bank holding
company for which 200 or more trading days are available from the CRSP and the
NASDAQ TAPES.

The standard market model is used in this study to estimate betas

and the market index used is equally-weighted market index.

Hence, these beta

estimates are different from Scholes-Williams betas reported in the new CRSP
tapes.

Scholes and Williams (1977) calculated betas from nonsynchronous data

using a methodology different from market model methodology.
4.4 Analysis of Results

Table 4 presents estimates of the explanatory variables using standard
deviation of equity return

(SIG~IAE)

as the dependent variable.

Off-balance

sheet items constitute a heterogeneous collection of participations,
commitments, and other arrangements.

Therefore, it is difficult to represent

the influence of these items in any simple way.

The off-balance sheet variables

are grouped into seven classes according to their similar characteristics.
off-balance sheet variables possess negative coefficients.

All

One of these

coefficients is significant at the 1% level (ASLC), four are significant at the
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57. level (AOB, ACOJDI, AACLC, AOBS) and one is significant at the 1% level

(AS'iAP).

The coefficient of APART is not significantly different from zero.

These results suggest that at least some of the off-balance sheet variables are
risk-reducing.

These results support the findings of Lynge and Lee (1987) that

off-balance sheet items reduce total risk.
The hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification potential of OBS items
dominates the risk-increasing potential of OBS items can be tested by comparing
the estimated coefficient signs of leverage and diversification (LEV and DIV)
variables.

The significant negative sign of diversification coefficient (DIV)

indicates an inverse relationship between diversification and risk.

Therefore,

banks can achieve higher level of diversification by engaging in off-balance
sheet activities and consequently reduce risk.
possess expected signs.

The coefficients of LEV and DIV

The significant positive coefficient of leverage (LEV)

variable indicates a direct relationship

betl~een

leverage employed and risk.

Therefore, banks can increase leverage by engaging in off-balance sheet
activities and consequently increase risk.

Given that leverage and

diversification variables are on-balance sheet measures, the significant
negative coefficients of some off-balance sheet items, therefore, imply that
diversification potential of ODS items dominates leverage potential after
accounting for such effects by on-balance sheet variables, and hence result in
an overall reduction of risk.
The credit risk and dividend payout ratio (ALOSS and POR) variables have
the expected positive and negative signs respectively, and are statistically
significant.

The positive coefficient of credit risk (ALOSS) variable indicates

a direct relationship
banks.

betl~een

customer default-risk and overall riskiness of

The negative coefficient of dividend payout ratio (POR) variable implies

19

an lnverse relationship bet"een bank risk and dividend payout ratio.

The size

(ASIZE) variable has an unexpected positive coefficient; but here size (ASIZE)
is also highly correlated with off-balance measures of risk, perhaps pointing
towards a simultaneity between size and off-balance sheet items.

These results

are, however, consistent with previous studies of market-determined and
accounting-determined measures of bank risk variables (Pettway, 1976).
Table 5 presents estimates of explanatory variables using BETA as the
dependent variable.

The estimated coefficients of all OBS items have expected

negative signs, and all but one are not statistically significant.

These

results suggest that most OBS activities have no effect on systematic bank

r~sk.

The results are consistent with Pettway (1976) and Lynge and Lee (1987).
Standby Letters of Credit (ASLC) is significantly negative at the 57. level,
implying that well-diversified investors price this banking activity as
risk-reducing.

This result validates a similar finding by Brewer, Koppenhaver

and Wilson (1986) that equity market prices Standby Letters of Credit (ASLC) as
risk reducing.
The coefficients on the on-balance measures of risk have expected signs.
Leverage (LEV) is significantly positive at the 17. level and Diversification
(DIV) is significantly negative also at the 17. level.
also significantly positive at the 17. level.
statistically significant.

Credit Risk (ALOSS) is

Dividend payout ratio (POR) is not

Although interest rate risk and size (GAP and ASIZE)

have the wrong signs, they are not statistically significant.
Models using the total risk (SIGMAE) as the dependent variables have higher
average R2 compared to models using systematic risk (BETA) as the dependent
variables (.18 versus .14).

The fact that on-balance and off-balance measures

of risk explain a larger portion of total risk than systematic risk is not
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surprising.

Total risk includes both systematic risk and specific risk.

Certain diversifiable accounting measures of risk such as credit risk (ALOSS)
are expected to affect mostly specific risk rather than systematic risk.

V.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
The primary purpose of this paper has been to examine whether "market

discipline" exists for OBS banking risk.

Default-risk premia, total equity risk

and systematic beta risk have been regressed on various on-balance accounting
risk variables and off-balance sheet activities.
A pooled cross-section and time-series model, instead of simple OLS, was
employed to perform the econometric analysis for two reasons.

First,

cross-section or time-series data alone (32 cross-sections and 5 time-periods)
are not sufficient to extract enough degrees of freedom In regression analysis.
Second, cross-sections and time-series relationships of OBS banking decisions
are better captured by a pooled cross-section and time-series model.
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows.
First, test results support the hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification
effects of OBS banking items dominate risk increasing effects of DBS banking
items, thus reducing overall riskiness of banks.

Second, the results also

validate the hypothesis that OBS banking items do not affect systematic risk.
Only Standby Letters of Credit reduce systematic risk.

Third, all but one

(APART) off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing.
Fourth, the explanatory pOHers of the models are improved significantly
when equity variances, instead of market betas, are used to proxy for bank risk.
This is evidenced by significant increase in R2. Fifth, this study finds the
presence of a "market discipline" of OBS banking activities.

The market
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participants, both stockholders and subordinated debtholders, price DBS
activities as risk-reducing.

Sixth, several on-balance measures of accounting

risk also show statistically significant correlations with market measures of
risk.

Finally, pooled cross-section and time-series analysis of OBS banking

risk provides better coefficient estimates (increased t-statistics) and
increases the statistical significance of models (increased F-statistics).
The existing policy proposal to regulate OBS banking risk by bringing them
into a risk-based capital requirement can be analyzed in the light of empirical
findings of this research.

The results indicate that off-balance sheet

activities, in general, reduce total risk, but do not affect systematic risk,
implying that off-balance sheet risk is not a concern of well-diversified
stockholders.

,nlile bank regulators are concerned with total risk and the

probability of bank failures, the risk reducing potential of OBS activities
indicates that additional capital requirement of DBS banking activities will
penalize large banks.
There is clear evidence of a "market discipline" of DBS banking risk.
~Iarket

participants price these OBS activities as risk-reducing.

Therefore,

regulatory interference in the form of additional capital requirement of OBS
activities will create distortions in the financial intermediation market.
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TABLE 1
OBS ITEMS (SCIIEDULE Re-L OFF-BALANCE SnEET VARIABLES)
1.

Securities borrowed

2.

Securities lent

3.

Commitments to purchase when issued securities

4.

Commitments to see when issued securities

5.

Notational value of interest rate swaps

6.

SLC to U.S. addresses

7.

SLC to non U.S. addresses

8.

SLC participated to others

9.

Commercial letters of credit

10.

Commitments to purchase foreign currencies

11.

Unused loan commitments

12.

Commitments to purchase futures and forward contracts

13.

Commitments to sell futures and forward contracts

14.

Obligation to purchase under option contracts

15.

Obligations to sell under optons contract

16.

Participations in acceptances conveyed to others

17.

Participations In acceptances conveyed from others

18.

Other significant commitments or contingencies

19.

Loan sold or participated to others

The off-balance sheet variables consist of the following items:
OB
= 3+6+7-8+9+10+11
CO~ThI
= 12+13+14+15+18
PART
= 8+16+17+19
SVAP
=5
SLC
= 6+7-8
CLC
=9
ODS
= OB + CmlM + PART + SVAP + SLC + CLC

TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ACCOUNTING RISK VARIABLES,
OFF-BALANCE SnEET VARIABLES AND MARKET MEASURES OF RISK VARIABLES a

Variable

SYmbol

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Risk Premium

RPRM

.01500

.00665

Systematic Risk

BETA

.85337

.40162

Equity Risk

SImlAE

.01828

.01124

Off-balance sheet groups

AOB

.97779

.94551

Commitments

ACmThl

.16469

.24067

Participations

APART

.09618

.27160

National Value of Swaps

ASVAP

.32129

.52079

Commercial Letters of Credit

ACLC

.01523

Standby Letters of Credit

ASLC

.07394

.04687

Total Off-Balance Items

AOBS

1.58013

1.69662

Financial Leverage

LEY

.94938

.01317

Diversification Index

DIY

1.74527

.67445

Credit Risk

ALOSS

.01341

.00956

Interest Rate Risk

AGAP

.05955

.13878

Dividend Payout Ratio

POR

.50910

.74757

Logarithm of Assets

ASIZE

16.65717

.99929

a

.01095

For a sample of 32 commercial banks and bank holding companies over
1984-1988 periods.
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TABLE 4
Pooled Cross-Sect'on Ind TI.e-Serl .. Results
(Dependent Variable: SICHAE)
-2

[quI t 10n8

No,

Con.unt

,II
(2.31)"

6Gb

-.0015
(-2.06) .~

-

,Il

(2.90)'"

--,005
(-1.97)"

MMr

ASLC

ACkC

6SIIAr

ADDS

-

-

-

-

--

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

--

--

-

-

(2.48)"·

-

.• 15
0.10)'"
.15
0.11)·"

-

-

.052
(.95)

-

-

-

,10
(2.30)"

-

-

-

-

--

-

-

-

-

-.0026
(-1.56)'

-

-

-

-

-

-

•12
(2.H)"·

6

6COHM

.14
(2.96)'"

.13
(2.13)'"

HaTES:

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

-.0022
(-1.11)

~0.01

(-4.15)'"

-.061
(-"65)"

SICHAE Is the tnnuII hed standlrd deviation of .qulty roturns;
AOB, ACl»lH, APART, ASlC. AClC, ASWAP tnd AOOS repreunt u .. n
off-blhnc. shut variables;
lEV. DIV. AGAP, AlOSS, paR Ind ASIZE repreunt flnlnclal Iever
Ige, dIversificatIon Indu, Inlerest tile rill, credit rill,
dividend payout Ind logarltha
"lfts respecll .. ly;
Humbers In Ih. parlnthuu art t-stillstlcs;
Slgnlflclnc. level: ' . 10%; ••• 5%; •••• 1%.

0'

-.001
(-2.16)"

!.EV

DIV

IfAr

n.9SS

rOB

,34

..

,(8, U2)

,21

.8.12 , ..

·.0014
(2.10)"

,30

.9.28 ...

-.00009
(-2.01)"

.0011
(2.53)'"

.23

6.41 ...

.31
(5.34)"·

-.00004
(-"57)

.oon

,35

;1 .. 14· .. •

0.97)'"

-,00001
(-"66)"

.26
(4.66)·"

-.00001
(-2.16)"

,001
0.19)"

,21

1.91 ...

-.0018
(-1.90)"

-.00001
(-1.60)'

.n

-,00009
(-2.00)"

.0013
(2,00)"

• 26

:1.44 ....

(4.18)'"

-.0018
(-1.86)"

-.00001

.36
(5.56)'"

-.00001
(-1.41)'

.0019
(2.51)"·

• 21

.1.98 ....

.Il
(2.14)'"

-,0011
(-1.18)"

-.00001
(-1.42)

(5,40)'"

-,00001
(-1.41)

,I'
0.15)'"

-,OOIS
(-1.61)'

-.00001
(-1.80)'

.31
(5.17)'"

-,00008
(-2.48)"·

,13
(2.61)'"

-.0015
(-1.53)

-.00001'
(-1.55)

,28
(4.85)"

.086
(1.67)"

-.00001
-,0022
(-2.32)". (-2.07)"

.11

ASIZE

-.0009
(-.95)

~1.SI)·
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(2.49)'"

TABLE 5
Pooled Cross-Soctlon Ind Ttllo-Slrles Results
(Depondenl Variable: BelA)
[qua, 'on.
Ho,

).

ASWAP

10.58
(4.18)."

-,008
(-.19)

10.29
(4.61)"·

-

10.54
(4.16) ...

-

-

9.14
(4.12) ...

-

-

-

10.51
(4.80)"·

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(J .08)

-

-
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(-.56)
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-.000002
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9.60
(4.26)"·

-

-

-

-

-

-
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-

-
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(.44)

I) BETA Is the sYlIe.Ulc risk;
2) 600, ACOIfl, APART, ASlC, AClC, ASWAP and AODS ropresent seven
off-blhnce shut vlrhbhs;
3) LEY, DIY, AGAP, "LOSS, POR and ASIZE r.pruent 'Inlnetal hver
Ig., dlverslflcltlon Index, Inlerest rite risk, crodlt risk,
divIdend payout Ind 10gar1U.. of usets respectively;
4) Hulllbers tn the parentheses are t-shtlstlcs;
5) Sl9nlflclnc. level: •• lOS; ., • 5%; . . . . IS.
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